1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI 1 Sinkiang AI 1

the frequently loose and unscientific use of terms by foreign travelers and, much more important, by political motives on the part of Chinese administrators and Turkic nationalist leaders.

It is paradoxical that the sorting out of the peoples of Sinkiang is made more difficult by the fact that there is a rich Russian and Western literature about Sinkiang. For nearly a century there has been incessant publication of books about Inner Asia by explorers, archaeologists, geographers and casual travelers. Unfortunately, in the greater part of the foreign literature the descriptions of racial type, national grouping and political affiliation are excessively loose. For example, an American writer refers to the "distinctly Aryan" features of a regional group, to a "Kirghiz race," and to evidence of "Turkish and Mongol blood" in Kashgar.[5] "Aryan" can only be used properly in the description of languages, not of races, and even as a linguistic term it has now largely been abandoned, while peoples who speak the Turkish, Kirghiz, or Mongol languages may be of the most various and mixed origin.

Loose terminology in the foreign literature leads merely to misunderstanding or irritation, but it is politically dangerous when it is used to clothe the theories of administrators who are in a position to act. Contemporary Chinese political theories applied to concepts of race and nationality are of critical importance where Chinese administrative policy is confronted at every turn by growing nationalist movements which compete both with each other and with the projects of Chinese politicians. It is therefore essential to sort out the terms used both by Chinese administrators and by nationalist leaders, before attempting an accurate and rational classification of the many peoples who make up the population of Sinkiang.

In China, attempts to classify the peoples of Sinkiang in ways which reinforce political theories have led to four main trends.

The first trend is called *Ta Han Chu-i*, the "Greater Chinese Theory," by the Chinese who do not support it, and by Mongol, Uighur, and other nationalists who fear it. According to this defi-

[5] William James Morden, *Across Asia's Snows and Deserts*, New York, London, 1927.

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI1 Sinkiang AI1

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186

nition, all non-Chinese groups within the political frontiers of China are mere subvarieties of an ancient "greater Chinese" race, and should be absorbed into a standardized Chinese race. This trend was pushed by right-wing groups, during the period of Kuomintang ascendancy, who aimed at building up an uncompromising, militant, and expansionist ideology.

The second trend rejects the idea of forced assimilation and stresses instead a program of cultural diversity. It may therefore be labeled as "cultural autonomy." Its main exponents were Sheng Shih-ts'ai, former Governor of Sinkiang, and Chang Chih-chung, the chief Kuomintang emissary to the province after Sheng's withdrawal.

The third trend, which may be called "Pan-Turkish nationalism," emphasizes the fact that the majority of the population in Sinkiang speaks Turkic languages and belongs to the Moslem faith. It is most actively promoted by an Uighur group which has some Kazakh allies.

The fourth trend incorporates the idea of territorial as well as cultural autonomy and hence may be described simply as "federalism." It derives its ideas from Soviet nationality policy and is actively propagandized by the Chinese Communists, but has a considerable appeal to non-Communist, non-Chinese national minorities which would like to maintain their national identities but to live in harmony with the Chinese in a common state. It also has an appeal to moderate and liberal groups in and out of the Kuomintang, and would have been more widespread if it had not been for fear of the consequences of consenting to any part of the Communist program.

The foremost exponent of the "Greater Chinese Theory" has been Chiang Kai-shek. In his *China's Destiny*, as officially translated, all the people in China are mentioned as belonging to a single "Chunghua (Chinese) nation."[6] This "nation" is said to be made up of a number of groups which are described in the authorized translation as "stocks." In Chiang's opinion the differ-

[6] Chiang Kai-shek, *China's Destiny*, New York, 1947, p. 3. Parentheses in original text of translation.

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI 1 Sinkiang AI 1

829 * 563 186

ences among these "stocks" are limited to habits, customs, religious beliefs, and geographical environment, and do not include race or blood. "In short," he says, "the various stocks in China constitute not only one nation but also one race." [7]

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The generalized statements about race and nation made in *China's Destiny* have been applied to the nationality problems of Sinkiang by a writer belonging to the Kuomintang C.C. Clique, a tightly organized political machine whose political creed was to give extreme authoritarian interpretations of every opinion or theory uttered by Chiang Kai-shek. Following his terminology, the C.C. theorist divides the peoples of Sinkiang into fourteen "stocks." He then concludes that since they are not separate nationalities but merely "stocks" of a single "nation," therefore they are not entitled to separate political recognition, a thesis which other writers have extended into the cultural field as well. He proposes that "self-government" in Sinkiang should be based on small geographical units, the counties, regardless of differences between the peoples inhabiting these administrative units. In order to make impossible any other interpretation of the term for "self-government," he rejects, in so many words, the identification of "self-government" with "freedom" or "independence." [8]

In contrast to the rigidly assimilative approach of the C.C. extremists is the policy adopted by Sheng Shih-ts'ai when he was military dictator of Sinkiang. After the Japanese invasion of China in 1937 Sheng took into his administration a National Salvationist who appears to have been instrumental in elaborating for him a policy intended to effect a compromise between the Chinese monopoly of the provincial administration and the stirrings of nationalism among the non-Chinese peoples.

The National Salvationists in China at that time represented a point of view rather than a political organization. In face of the emergency created by the Japanese danger they believed in effecting the widest possible political coalitions and in taking the

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 13. The Chinese term for "nation" or "nationality" is *min-tsu*, and for "stock," *tsung-tsu*, also often translated as "clan."

[8] *Cf.* articles by Li Tung-fang in *Altai*, I, No. 2, Chungking, April 25, 1945, pp. 8–9 and pp. 15–18.

1: Lattimore [illegible] (no date) 1950 AI1 Sinkiang AI1

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stress off all political cleavages, from the great cleavage between the Kuomintang and the Communists down to all minor factional quarrels. The National Salvationist point of view was thus well suited to the attempt to create a harmonious wartime morale in Sinkiang.

829 114 *563

In line with the National Salvationist influence in his entourage, General Sheng proclaimed a program of "Six Great Policies." [9] Under one of the policies the peoples of Sinkiang were officially classified as belonging to fourteen "nationalities." These, listed in the order of the documents of the period, are as follows:

Chinese	202,239	Taranchi	41,307
Manchu	670	Tatar	4,601
Mongul	63,018	Kirghiz	65,248
Moslem (Dungan)	92,146	Uzbek	7,966
Uighur	2,900,173	Sibo	9,203
Kazakh	318,716	Solon	2,489
Tajik	8,867	Russian	13,408

The criteria for this classification are not clear. The admiring translator of the admiring adviser of Sheng Shih-ts'ai comments that the confusion in criteria is such as "would tend to eliminate this as any 'scientifically' worked out ethnic list." [10] Nor can it be based on geographic criteria, for the groups are not delimited on a territorial basis. It is not based on economic criteria, for some of the groups consist of pastoral herdsmen and others of sedentary cultivators. It is not based on religious criteria, for only the Chinese-speaking Moslems are listed as "Moslems," while followers of other religions are not mentioned as such, and other Moslems, such as the Uighurs, are not identified by religion. It is not based on administrative criteria, for Sinkiang is divided into ten administrative areas which cut across the fourteen groups. It is not based, finally, on any observable combination of these criteria.

[9] See Chapter III.

[10] Martin R. Norins, *Gateway to Asia: Sinkiang*, New York, John Day, 1944, p. 91.

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI 1 Sinkiang AI 1

It is probable that this classification, the vehicle of which appeared to be a policy more liberal than any previous Chinese policy toward minorities, represented an attempt at cautious partial imitation of the Soviet minority policy. The imitation, however, did not go very far. Sheng Shih-ts'ai, as his subsequent history shows, was by no means a slavish follower of the Soviet Union or its ideas. The sole emphasis in his program was on promoting the culture of the minority peoples, a policy which permitted cultural autonomy but carefully stopped short of territorial or political autonomy. Indeed it would appear, especially in view of Sheng's administrative gerrymandering of the province, that his purpose was to manipulate the national classifications which he recognized in such a way as to strengthen the dominant position of the Chinese minority in the province. General Sheng's classification was in fact influenced by political criteria which if not precisely scientific are at least as old as the earliest empire.

The program promoted by Sheng Shih-ts'ai was in large measure taken over by Chang Chih-chung when he in turn became head of the province. Like his predecessor, Chang was most active in stressing the cultural differences among the fourteen peoples of Sinkiang. Unlike the extreme authoritarians of the C.C. Clique, he appeared to concede that the different peoples of Sinkiang, rather than such administrative units as the counties, should provide the basis of self-rule. "The administration of Sinkiang," he says, "should be entrusted to the various racial groups and should function under the guidance of the many national leaders of the province." [11] This formula, however, glosses over the fact that the administrative divisions of Sinkiang do not coincide with the distribution of "the various racial groups." Further limitations on the right of self-rule are indicated by the following:

> The Central Government is willing to surrender all political power to the people of Sinkiang on condition that the

[11] Chang Chih-chung, "Dilemma in Sinkiang," *Pacific Affairs*, XX, New York, 1947, p. 426.

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI1 Sinkiang AI1

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territory and sovereignty of the nation suffer no impairment thereby. The Central Government will not tolerate anything possibly detrimental to the territorial integrity or sovereignty of the State — even at the cost of a war.[12]

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In opposition to the foregoing Chinese policies stands the "Pan-Turkic nationalism" of a group of native leaders who deal with the population of Sinkiang within the framework of a policy designed to strengthen their control over all the people living within the boundaries of the province. Foremost among these leaders is the recent Kuomintang governor of the province, Masud Sabri, a wealthy Uighur landowner and merchant from the Kulja area. Likewise prominent is Mohammed Emin, an Uighur who studied for several years in Turkey and is counted as one of the intellectual leaders of Sinkiang.[13]

In the view of Masud and Emin, China does not consist of a single "nation" or "nationality" and Sinkiang does not contain fourteen groups of people, whether designated as nationalities or by any other term. They use nationality, however, as the basis for their own classification of the peoples of the province, and define the term with great precision by listing the criteria which in their opinion determine nationality. These criteria are: (1) uniform language; (2) common territory; (3) similar habits and customs; (4) common will; (5) common religion; (6) common race; (7) common clothing, adornments, and other elements like blood relationship. On the basis of these criteria they conclude that the seven groups designated by Sheng Shih-ts'ai as Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Taranchi, Uzbeks, Tatars, and Tajiks are all of one nationality. In their opinion these groups together comprise the "Turkic nation," despite the fact that the Tajiks do not speak a Turkic language, but an Iranian one.

As Turkic nationalists, Masud and Emin oppose the use of terms like Uighur and Kazakh to represent different nationalities. Actually, they say, the old subgroupings should be redesignated

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 428.

[13] For the views of these men see *Altai*, Vol. I, No. 2, Chungking, April 1945.

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI 1 Sinkiang AI 1

563* 829 • 186

as "tribes," for all their members are descended, like the ancient Hsiungnu and Yüeh-chih, from a single Turkic nation.

The Turkic nation as defined by Masud and Emin would include about nine tenths of the population of Sinkiang. They divide the remaining one tenth into three nationalities: the Chinese, the Manchus, and the Mongols. In the category of "Chinese" they include the two groups designated by Sheng as "Chinese" and "Moslems": Moslem in this context being a synonym for the Dungans, who are Moslem by religion and Chinese in language. In the category of "Manchus" they include the three groups designated by Sheng as "Manchu," "Sibo," and "Solon." They also suggest that the last group in Sheng's list, the Russians, may perhaps form a fifth nationality in Sinkiang, though they are somewhat dubious of this since, they say, the Russians in Sinkiang are citizens of the Soviet Union and not of the Republic of China.

The significance of the thesis of a single Turkic nation is revealed by the anticipated relationship of the "Turkis" toward the Chinese state on the one hand and toward the other nationalities in Sinkiang on the other. This relationship in turn is revealed by the terminology employed by the Turkic nationalists in their demands for elevation to nationhood. In the course of a discussion with Li Tung-fang, Mohammed Emin denies that the "Turkis" might want to become "independent." Indeed, he does not even demand the right to "self-determination" which, as he himself mentions, was conceded to the minorities in China in Sun Yat-sen's Manifesto to the First Kuomintang Congress in 1924. He and other Turkic nationalists ask for no more than the right to "self-government."

While demanding self-government for themselves, the exponents of Turkic nationalism do not seem to concede this right to the other nationalities in Sinkiang. The Turkis, they say, live in every part of Sinkiang. The name of the province should be changed to one which would reflect their dominant position. Disregarding the interests of other groups, they demand that all Sinkiang be officially designated as "Turkistan."

Thus Turkic nationalism displays a dual aspect. It is willing to

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI1 Sinkiang AI1

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186

accept a position of subservience to the Chinese majority in the Republic of China, but it seeks to attain a position of dominance over the whole population of Sinkiang. In this latter objective, Turkic nationalists are in competition with authoritarian Chinese; but the degree of political opposition between Chinese assimilationists like Li Tung-fang and Turkic nationalists like Masud Sabri and Mohammed Emin should not be exaggerated. That there exists an area of agreement between the two groups is evidenced by the fact that Masud Sabri was himself a member of the C.C. Clique and was sponsored for the governorship of Sinkiang by that extreme right-wing faction in the Kuomintang.

There exists also, opposing the theories of these Chinese and Turkic schools, the federal idea of devising territorial and cultural arrangements so as to minimize antagonisms springing from racial, ethnic, or cultural differences. Although many people in China and among national minorities would like to live without such antagonisms, only the Chinese Communists have attempted to work out a theory and program of federalism, and even their discussion of the subject is marked by important gaps.

In their discussions of theory, the Chinese Communists have borrowed heavily from Soviet ideas. They start with Stalin's definition that: "A nation is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up, manifested in a community of culture." Following out this definition they conclude that the Republic of China is made up of a number of different nationalities. The Chinese are the preponderant nationality; other nationalities are referred to as "national minorities." Among those specifically listed in the Communist literature are the Mongols, Tibetans, Yi, Miao, Yao, and Hui (Moslems). The use of the term "Hui" here covers all Moslems, without making a distinction between Chinese-speaking and Turkish-speaking Moslems.

Although the Communists are quite specific in defining nationality, they have done little in the way of applying their ideas to specific groups of people. There does not seem to exist any

1: Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI 1 Sinkiang AI 1

complete Communist demarcation of the nationalities in Sinkiang. Nor does there seem to be, in the Chinese Communist literature, any discussion of the administrative units under which a federative nationality policy could operate. However, a general policy for the multinational Republic of China was proposed by the First All-China Congress of Soviets in 1930 in the following resolution:[14]

> ". . . In such regions as Mongolia, Tibet, Sinkiang, Yunnan and Kweichow, in which a majority of the population belongs to another, non-Chinese nationality, the toiling masses of these nationalities have the right to determine by themselves whether they want to secede from the Chinese Soviet Republic and form their own independent state, or to join the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or to form an autonomous region of the Chinese Soviet Republic.[15]

The Chinese Communists have since abandoned their Soviet regime in favor of what they call "the New Democracy," but their policy toward national minorities does not appear to have undergone basic modification. Speaking before the 1945 Congress of the Communist Party, Mao Tze-tung said that the Chinese "demand better treatment for the national minorities of China, according them the right of self-determination and of forming a union with the Hans [Chinese] on a voluntary basis." Mao's failure to repeat the earlier offer of the right of secession may indicate that he has foremost in mind a union of national states under the formula of a "Union of Democratic Republics." [16]

[14] *The Soviets in China*, Moscow, 1933, p. 440 (in Russian).

[15] In this resolution the Chinese Communists declared for the principle of the right of secession. In his speech of August 24, 1945, recognizing the independence of the Mongolian People's Republic, Chiang Kai-shek also recognized the right of secession, not only for the Mongols but also for other non-Chinese minorities — a striking modification of his views expressed in *China's Destiny* and elsewhere. Thus on the right of secession President Chiang and the Chinese Communists were within reach of at least verbal agreement. Other Chinese assimilationists, and the "Pan-Turkic" nationalists, have not conceded the right of secession.

[16] Mao Tze-tung, *The Fight For a New China*, New York, 1945, pp. 35 and 44.

SN 563 182 The Chinese, fully aware of their old culture and history, continued up to our times to consider Mongols, Turks and Tibetans if not as barbarians, at least as inferior peoples. This attitude of the Chinese caused, perhaps as an understandably psychological reaction, the superiority-complex behaviour of some minorities. In addition, the higher efficiency and diligence of the average Chinese peasant in comparison with the average non-Chinese did not help mutual understanding and esteem.

SN 563 668 [641] Constitutionally, for the first time in centuries, the minorities are not only considered by the present Communistic regime as absolutely equal to any other racial or ethnic group but they are also treated with consideration. The Communists do everything in order to avoid hurting the nationalistic feeling of the minorities. The price the minorities [199] have to pay for a certain degree of local self-determination, independence and self-government is the thorough acceptance of the party line with all its consequences, above all, collectivization, which certainly means an incredible change of the traditional economic pattern, because eight ninths of the total population are peasants and only the remaining one ninth are pastoral nomads, whose livestock - collectivization is yet to come.

SN 563 829 Since the overwhelming majority of the population of the Northwest consists of Chinese, the attitude toward the state in general is positive. Natural recognition of the government lies in the traditional line of Chinese behavior. The deep-rooted respect for "magistracy" and officialdom implies this basic recognition.

SN 563 668 578 669 The relationship between Chinese Communist rulers and ruled Chinese (whether Communist or not) might be described as less frictional than that between the non-Chinese minorities and the Chinese Communist rulers, that is, a certain tension and uneasiness between the Uighur Autonomous Region and the government has occurred several times during the last five years, and also between the Tibetans of Chinghai and the Communist authorities, and the recent uprisings of Tibetans (July 1956) seem to be of major significance.

SN 829 Generally speaking, the average Chinese in the Northwest has neither a sense of common destiny or any sense of mission.

SN 829 571 The average Chinese peasant's life is concerned with one main and urgent problem: livelihood. Quite different is the situation among the intelligentsia, who are culture conscious to such a degree that it often results in a feeling of superiority over other peoples. Among those intellectuals there is a strong feeling and conviction that China has a grand mission in Asia - cultural and political leadership.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

I. The Nomads

A. The Nomadic Turks (Kazakh, Kirghiz and Uzbek)

The distinguishing feature of the social structure of the nomadic Turks of the Northwest is that social status is acquired by wealth (sheep, cows, camels and horses) or by descent. Descent among the nomadic Turks is always patrilineal, and a modified form of ultimogeniture is found. As the sons of each family marry, each one receives an equal share of the family's wealth. This includes a winter pasture. Only the youngest son inherits the father's property (tents, precious furniture, etc.).

The smallest social unit is the family; a number of related families constitute an aul which is at the same time the migration unit in regard to pastoral nomadism.

Unrestricted authority is held by the patriarch of the family. The patriarch of the most influential family (measured in terms of wealth and family connections) becomes the chieftain of an aul.

A certain number of auls constitute the great aul. The latter possesses a common property brand which is called tamga (the tamga marks are to be found mostly on the left side of animals, on tents and on gravestones. The tamgas are believed to be of totemistic origin and therefore thought to be a very old institution. Their purpose, obviously, is to distinguish and identify herds and other property.

The great aul (which might also be called a sub-clan) is led by a chieftain whose title is bäk, beg, biy, bey, or pex, depending upon the Turkic dialect concerned. The chieftain of such a great aul functions as a leader and as a judge whose duty it is to mediate and to appease in disputes between single persons, families and auls. Several great auls constitute a clan, which is also led by one of the bäks of the great auls. Several clans together form a tribe which is led by a khan or sultan and finally two or three tribes constitute a horde which in turn form the nation; e.g., the Kazakh have four hordes, the Kirghiz two, etc. Sometimes it is difficult to decide what constitutes a great aul or sub-clan and what is actually a clan. An extended family may have the function of an aul; a great clan may have the function of a clan; while a declined clan only has the function of an aul.

A Kazakh Turk could define his position within his own people by stating that he belongs a)to the Turkic race b) to the Kazakh nation c) to the Middle horde d) to the Kipchak tribe e) to the Toru Aibgyr clan f) to the Shashli sub-clan (great aul) g) to the Boshai branch (aul) and h) to the Janay sub-branch (extended family). For the Kirghiz and Kazakhs, a clan can be defined as a social group which, by force of either real or putative consanguinity,

THE FAMILY

S N 121 59 563 I. Introduction

Northwest China is heavily populated by national minorities. In the province of Sinkiang, the Chinese even form a minority group and the Turkic Moslems constitute the majority. Therefore, in a discussion of the family in this area, general statements applying to the population as a whole would not apply, but a distinction has to be made between several different ethnic elements.

For the purposes of the present section, the following rough division suggests itself: (a) Turkic sedentary Moslems; (b) Turkic nomadic Moslems; (c) the Dungans or Chinese Moslems; (d) the Tibetans; (e) the Mongours; (f) the Mongols, and (g) the Chinese. The last two groups are discussed in detail in their respective handbooks, the IMAR Handbook and the General Handbook of China.

S N 709 59 183 581 Among all Moslems Islam forms the ideal concept of the family. In Islamic society the institution of the family has always been one of primary importance. The family is considered the basic essential of human civilization. Having a family, and being a dutiful member of one, is not only regarded as necessary, but is expressly a religious obligation. Marriage, the step leading to the establishment of a family, is a sacred contract into which each Moslem must enter. A Moslem who, without just reason, does not marry and does [589] not establish a family, is considered almost as a heretic.

S N 59 182 [554] [589] The family's function is primarily for reproduction of the group and the continuation of the family. The institution of the family, furthermore, provides security and peace of mind for its members. The family man is respected and esteemed in Moslem society; he is considered honorable and trustworthy. An unmarried man is likely to be looked upon with some suspicion and distrust.

S N 59 709 183 Since the family plays such a significant role in Moslem society, there is great emphasis on its unity and closeness. This is probably best expressed in the following quotation from the Koran, "...and Allah has made wives for you from yourselves and has given you sons and daughters from your wives." This closeness resulting from the blood relationship is extended to all other phases of family life.

S N 593 Love and compassion should underlie all the relationships within the family. In relations between a man and his wife, or wives, between one kin to another, love is stressed as the basis.

S N [829] A man's behavior within his family reflects his attitude toward society as a whole. If there is love in his heart for his family, he will also have compassion for others and be of service to society.

S N 592 593 In the family, the man's position is always superior to that of the woman, regardless of his age. The wife is, accordingly, put in an inferior position to that of her husband, being under his control completely. The head of the house holds unquestioned authority

S N 592 593 over the members of the household. Full obedience and respect is expected from the children, who are obliged to take care of their parents when the latter reach old age.

S N 595 799 Islam allows a man to have more than one wife. The truly religious person will not exceed four wives.

S N 779 ● 829 Islam grew in a tribal society and retained many of the loyalty concepts relating to the tribes. After his own family, a man owes loyalty to his tribe. This attitude is strongly reflected in the religious writings. As Islam spread, these concepts were carried to societies, other than those residing in the Arabian Peninsula.

II. The Sedentary Moslems of Sinkiang

A. Family Organization

S 121 592 In this discussion the concept of family refers to a unit consisting of members related to each other by blood, marriage or adoption and having a common budget and common property. Persons remaining in the family and those temporarily absent are included. Servants or relatives temporarily visiting with the family are considered members of the household, but not members of the family unit.

S 592 563 Among the Turkic Moslems of Sinkiang the family consists of a man, his wife or wives, and their unmarried children. In some cases it may also include their divorced or widowed daughters. Occasionally the married sons stay with their family for a short period. Each family unit occupies its own separate house. One may have a few households to take care of, in the case that one has more than one wife. Polygamy is permitted according to Islamic S 595 563 law. However, the majority of the men and particularly the peasants, cannot afford to keep more than one wife at a time. Wealthier people and well-to-do travelling merchants often have more than one household. Each wife is usually kept in a different section of town, or in different towns altogether (this is the case when the husbands are merchants and officials who travel to a great extent). The familiar harem of other Moslem countries hardly exists as such in Sinkiang. The individualism of the women, the freedom S [562] allowed to them and their jealous nature and temperament make [152] it impossible for a man to keep more than one wife under the same roof. This factor complicates the nature of the nuclear structure of the family, and sometimes results in one man's having similar obligations to more than one household.

S 563 [162] [587] Families usually are large, regardless of their wealth or poverty. It is considered a disgrace for a woman not to have many children. This is one reason why a man often prefers to marry a divorced woman with child (a son preferably), who has already proved her ability to bear children.

/Turks of Sinkiang/

815 668 177 is not quite clear in the minds of the people - they are acquainted with the science of medicine, for which they have great respect, they are bombarded by propaganda telling them of the evil uses of scientific discoveries, mainly the "germ warfare" supposedly launched against China by the United States, and they are encouraged to adopt a "scientific" attitude toward the ideology of Communism, the science of revolution.

829 668 177 [439] Industrialization is, for the most part, a thing of the future as far as Sinkiang is concerned. The Turks do not even have a word for industry. They use now the term caliskanlik, meaning industriousness. Not much has been done in this field, and the products of industry have been brought to Sinkiang from China Proper and Soviet Russia. Since the process of industrialization will so strongly affect a large part of the urban population consisting of independent small artisans, shopkeepers and merchants, it is very likely that these groups will not look with favor at this process.

423 668 177 With the strong emphasis that the Turkic people put on ownership of property, particularly landed property, it is only natural that great resistance is encountered from both the small farmers and the big landowners to the process of collectivization. The incentive to work will, in many cases of collectivization, be taken away from the farmers, when they are not allowed to anjoy the products of their labor. Collectivization is forced on the Turkic people, and involves a basic change in their economic outlook and ideas. Collectivization may not affect the tenants as strongly, since they have never tilled their own land, and the loss to them is not as great, economically or psychologically, as it is to those who owned their land, no matter how small their property was.

K. Attitude toward the Present Political Regime

829 668 177 Communist sources describe the reaction of the national minorities to the new regime and its leaders as follows: "Political consciousness is rising; the people's love for Chairman Mao Tse-tung and their homeland is heightened by all that is happening day by day (Ulanfu, Vice-Chairman of the Commission of Nationalities Affairs, Report of the General Program for the Implementation of Regional Autonomy for Nationalities), or, "The growth of the movement to resist United States aggression and aid Korea has further added to the education in patriotism among our national minorities whose overwhelming majority deeply love and warmly support Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the Central People's Government."

In spite of these statements, it is difficult to conceive how the Turks so "deeply love and warmly support" a Chinese leader who has not brought about the fulfillment of their national aspirations, but those of Chinese nationalism, and who has united them not with the world of Islam but with the Communist block. The glori-

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/Turks of Sinkiang/

fication of a non-Moslem is not likely to be a very spontaneous movement on the part of the Turkic people, nor is it conceivable that they "deeply love and warmly support the Central People's Government." To most of them it is a remote government in a foreign country - China - to which most of them have never been, and it is very difficult for them to visualize it as the government to whom they owe supreme allegiance.

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Direct authority is represented by the local government bodies. Although composed of many Chinese officials, the representatives of the local population fill prominent positions in the local government also. There is a certain amount of pride felt by the local people owing to the fact that some of the important leaders are Turkic Moslems, who have achieved a position of importance in the government. It is quite likely that leaders like Burkhan and Saifuddin are quite popular among the Turks of Sinkiang. The Turkic refugees abroad and the strongly nationalistic-minded ones who still are in Sinkiang, look at these leaders participating in the Chinese Communist regime as traitors cooperating with the oppressive powers, rather than national heroes.

II. The Mongols of the Northwest

A. Introductory Remarks

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Northwest China is the arena for some 150,000 Mongolian herdsmen. Although uniform in respect to their Buddhistic-nomadic culture and language (with the exception of the Monguors who speak a Mongolian-Tibetan mixed dialect) they do not constitute a political or areal unit, living as they do thousands of miles apart, in the northeastern area of Sinkiang, around the Tsaidam swamps area, in the Edzingol area, in the northern part of Kansu and even in some enclaves in Shensi. Since Chingis Khan, they have never constituted a political unit, although Legdan Khan united the major parts of them into a short-lived empire (see Historical Setting).

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The reason for this lack of unity is first and above all, the fact that the Mongols of the Northwest area are outnumbered by Chinese (30 million) and Turks (4 million). The second reason is the treatment by the Manchus who shifted the Mongol banners from place to place in connection with the Manchu, Sibo, and Solon banners, who constituted the main and more reliable garrisons in the frontier area. The reliability of the Mongolian garrisons was partly due to the policy toward the banner and tribal leaders who were made wang (king) or nobles of various ranks.

B. Views of the People with Respect to their own Country

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The average Mongol of the Northwest is fully aware of the fact that he belongs to a minority and that all he possesses are his

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/Mongols of the Northwest/

N 829 pastures, but not a country. Nationalistic movements of recent * 563 times hardly reached the Mongols of the Northwest (see Political + [668] Dynamics) and serious attempts to join a greater Mongolian unit S (Outer Mongolia) have never been made by the Mongols of Sinkiang. • 829 For most of the other Mongolian splinter groups of Chinghai, 563 Kansu and Shensi, such an ambition would have been still more [668] unrealistic due to their geographical separation from Inner and Outer Mongolia and due to their more progressed sinification, which is especially true for the Chinghai and Shensi Mongols. (Two heretofore isolated groups in Kansu, the Mongols of Alashan and Edzingol have recently been incorporated into the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.)

For the Mongols of the Northwest their country is China and their supreme representative, the court of the government in Peking. Their immediate superiors and chiefs were the banner leaders who observed a rather strict loyalty to China's court or government as they received a yearly apanage and, after having performed special, mostly military, services for the court in Peking, were promoted to higher ranks which in turn meant an increase in their yearly presents received from Peking. This fact did not encourage them to make any attempts toward independence, self-determination or autonomy. The Mongols of the Northwest thus did not think of their country but of their domain. An important aspect of this view is also the cultural basis of the Northwest Mongols, Lamaism, whose realm is everywhere where Buddhists live and whose center is Lhasa (Tibetan: 'the city of S gods') rather than Peking. For the religious world is the real N and essential world to them, the Dalai Lama, the supreme spiri- [192] tual leader of all Lama Buddhists, became more real and essential to them than the supreme political leader in Peking.

C. Traditional Attitudes of the Northwest Mongols

No matter where Mongols live, some trends are common to all of them: the pride of being a Mongol; the pride of speaking Mongolian, which is considered by them as melodious, sonorous, and full-toned in comparison with the 'chirping and cackling' of S Chinese; and finally, the pride of being a free nomad, herding N wherever he wants and riding wherever he wishes. Whenever [197] Mongols meet each other they can communicate with each other as their dialects differ only slightly. They realize, too, that they have even more in common than only external appearance and language, something which is of utmost importance to all of them - their Lamaistic religion. In these respects they certainly feel that they constitute at least an ethnic unit, very different from the Chinese for whom they do not want to be mistaken.

These feelings and emotional attitudes were hardly sufficient to arouse animosity or hatred toward the Chinese but rather an unjustified and unwarranted feeling of superiority. The progressive advancement of Chinese settlers, however, who gradually took over lot after lot of their pasture land led not only to hatred but resulted in petty uprisings, so that even the Manchu government several times issued laws against Chinese advancements, which were hardly ever observed. Complaints of the Mongol leaders did not help and they were numerically too weak for military action.

Only in the case of the sedentary Mongols of the Northwest, the Monguors, such problems never arose, as they had become so strongly sinified that their tribal leaders were considered by the Chinese themselves as Chinese officials with a reputation of absolute loyalty.

D. Attitudes toward the Communist Regime

Throughout the history of the Mongols, their pattern of living, internal and external, changed very little. Their families constituted auls, the auls, clans and the clans, tribes. Besides this structural organization, there existed the military institutions of banners and leagues. The internal order was always strict and the laws and regulations hard. A leader who was not strict and hard would hardly be considered as a leader and the history of the Mongols shows that a strong leader always evoked their respect and found them to be submissive followers.

In view of this fact there is little doubt that the Mongols of the Northwest will respect the iron hand of Peking, even though probably with mixed emotions. The creation of autonomous chous (districts) populated only or overwhelmingly by Mongols might give them a certain feeling of self-determination and cultural autonomy. The organization of veterinarian stations which take care of their livestock will certainly be welcome to the nomads; the organization of a widespread educational system might be another asset for the Communists as it fosters Mongolian language and promotes literature written in Mongolian. The establishment of permanent winter sites, on the other hand, which is contradictory to Mongol customs and above all the threatening collectivization of their livestock, which is the Mongols' highest and greatest treasure, are negative aspects. This, of course, refers to the present generation only. The younger and youngest generation, subject to a very vivid and propagandistic education will undoubtedly change their attitude toward the present regime, a process for which the Khalkhas of Outer Mongolia are a classic example. (see also IMAR Handbook, same section).

III. The Chinese, Chinese Moslems and Sedentary Tibetans

An attempt at a cohesive description of popular attitudes among

/Chinese, Chinese Moslems and Sedentary Tibetans/

the Chinese in the Northwest meets with several obstacles. The one most difficult to overcome is the lack of attitudinal uniformity due to a multitude of historical, environmental and social factors which have molded the people's behavior in the Northwest. There is, to begin with, the difference between the urban and the rural situation, which even though prevalent all over China, has made for a specially pronounced diversity in the Northwest. Generally speaking, in centers like Sian or Lanchou attitudes are met with which do not differ too much from those prevalent in other cities of China. It has to be taken into account, though, that Sian has been the capital of the Chinese Empire for centuries up to about one thousand years ago, and this fact still shapes certain attitudes of the citizens of Sian today. Lanchou, on the other hand, is most definitely a frontier city, the last major outpost of Chinese civilization with an ostentatious pride in local traditions and relics of a cultural or esthetic nature, but open, on the other hand, to a colorful mixture of influences coming from a variety of peoples beyond the pale. The urban attitudes prevalent in Sian and Lanchou thus differ perceptively and both cities differ in certain respects from other Chinese metropolises. Their peculiarities influence in turn urban-rural and social tensions in a specific way.

The Chinese rural scene, on the other hand, displays a variety of factors accounting for attitudinal diversity. There are the differences of the loess-cave dwellers and the mud-hut dwellers, those of the irrigational farmer and the one on hills or mountain slopes; there are regions of compact minorities or dominant majorities of Moslems and finally, regions along the few great thoroughfares and regions of remote seclusion.

The picture gains in complexity in the real frontier areas, Western Kansu, Chinghai and Sinkiang, where the Chinese constitute a minority. Here the diversity of peoples with whom the Chinese have contact, the geographical differences, the professional differences, differences of the duration of stay, of the home province of the settlers account for attitudinal patterns which change from settlement to settlement.

What is attempted in the following pages is, in view of the difficulties, and furthermore, in view of the pitifully scanty coverage of the area in the literature, to present a few samples of pertinent observations, which might add up to some general notions. In the selection, stress has been laid on the frontier regions, as the regions within the pale, reference still can be made to the General Handbook.

In their book, The Gobi Desert (New York, 1944), Mildred Cable and Francesca French describe the Chinese people's life in the fortress of Chia-yu-kuan in Western Kansu, which they visited in the thirties: "Inside of the fortress, life was divided into three distinct sections, each of which had an existence quite

/Chinese, Chinese Moslems and Sedentary Tibetans/

S 563 642 643 179 829 The old administration of the Khan was not always liked by the Moslems, but he and his people were one, and they understood each other well. His Oriental style of court life was appreciated by the Turkis, and the Khan, by virtue of his hereditary title, was unquestionably accepted by them. There was immediate resentment among the populace at the suggested changes, and the resentment became the more bitter when a great display of highly organized officialdom was made.

S 563 179 631 642 829 [423] At the same time, the whole area of Hami was carefully surveyed and the land redistributed. Three large administrative districts were arranged and given names which dated back to the Han dynasty. The new government was to be wholly in Chinese hands, and the old Khanate system was to vanish. Chinese magistrates were appointed to hear the law cases and Chinese tax-collectors were to levy the dues and convey them to the capital, where they would be allocated to the respective departments. These propositions all seem legitimate to the Chinese authority and they were presented to the people as improved measures of justice; but the Moslems did not like them and had a great deal of suspicion towardsthem. There was also the rumor that some unappropriated land which the Turki farmers would have liked to use was given to the Chinese and that arrears of taxes from which the Chinese were exempt were demanded from Moslem landowners.

S [669] Suddenly that dangerous thing so well known to the Oriental as a "breath of fury" rose fiercely among men who had hitherto dealt only with their own Khan, and they unanimously determined on revolt.

N 829 565 Fan Ch'ang-chiang, a well-known journalist connected with the most influential Chinese daily Ta Kung Pao in the prewar period and now editor of the People's Daily in Peking, reported, after a trip to the Northwest in 1936 through Shensi, Kansu, Chinghai, and Ninghsia, that the common people, especially the peasants in

N [651] Kansu, all had a very bad impression of the government. Because there were so many kinds of taxes, the people thought that the government had nothing to do but to collect taxes from the common

N 565 181 562 829 people. The people did not trust the government. In regard to social customs Fan says that the Chinese in Kansu are very conservative in matters which have anything to do with their women. Even middle-aged women of respectable families can hardly have anny opportunity to be seen by or to be spoken to by any man who is not a relative or a neighbor. Young ladies must absolutely not be seen by strangers. Soldiers who have come from the coastal provinces and who are accustomed to more liberal relations between the two sexes were resented by the local people because

N 565 829 181 they acted rather freely toward their women folk. Notwithstanding their bad impression of the government and their resentment toward the "outside" soldiers, the common Chinese in Kansu are